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Abstract
Despite impressive growth in the early twenty-first century, Indonesia’s economic
performance in the post-colonial era lagged behind that of its neighbours in Malaysia
and Singapore. The different development paths chosen, particularly in the treatment
of foreign (and, especially, ex-colonial) investment, were central to this—Indonesia’s
rejection of Western capital in the 1950s and 1960s, and continued suspicion of foreign
economic influence in the 1970s, contrasted with the more open approach of Malaysia
and Singapore. How the post-colonial foreign presence was dealt with was largely
conditioned by how decolonization was settled—the restrictive agreements reached
between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and ongoing Dutch occupation of Irian Jaya,
were sources of widespread resentment, and differed significantly from the more
liberal approach of the British towardsMalaysian and Singaporean independence. The
short-term settlement of decolonization was therefore of greater significance than the
longer-term nature of colonial rule in determining post-colonial economic patterns.
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Introduction: Short-Term and Long-Term Colonial Legacies
Compared to its neighbours in Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia took a dis-
tinct development path in the post-colonial era. Indonesia nationalized Dutch
assets between 1957 and 1959, and subsequently placed the remainingWestern
enterprises under government supervision between 1963 and 1965, constitut-
ing ‘at the time the pinnacle of economic nationalism in modern Asian his-
tory’ (Thee 2015:208). Malaysia and Singapore, however, continued with liberal
policies towards expatriate enterprise. This article argues that heterogeneous
patterns of decolonization influenced these different outcomes. The financial
and economic ‘settlements’ for Indonesia in 1949 and for Malaya/Malaysia in
1957 and 1963 (as well as the terms of the final rundown of military bases in
Singapore and Malaysia after 1968) explain much about subsequent economic
developments. Firm guarantees for Dutch businesses in Indonesia, plus the
transfer of debt obligations to the Republic, are contrasted with the looser
arrangements for Malaysia and Singapore (and the ongoing supply of devel-
opment and military aid by the uk).
The former Dutch and British territories in maritime Southeast Asia expe-
rienced similar post-colonial dependence upon export sectors dominated by
ex-colonial enterprises. At least 70%of foreigndirect investment (fdi) in early-
independent Indonesia was Dutch (Lindblad 2008:22). In 1972, two-thirds of
foreign capital in Malaysia was reckoned to be British (White 2004:6). The
independent countries remained within ex-imperial monetary structures—
the Netherlands Monetary Area for Indonesia (to 1957); the sterling area for
Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore (to 1972). The confluences notwithstanding,
the contrasting, short-term nature of British and Dutch decolonization influ-
enced how successor regimes addressed the alien economic presence. More-
over, the variegated responses to ex-colonial business are central to explaining
the differing economic performances of the countries.
This comparative analysis contributes to debates about the efficacy of colo-
nial rule. Lange’s study of the long-term development legacies of British colo-
nialism argues that directly ruled ex-British dependencies have fared better—
in terms of contemporary Human Development Indices (hdi)—than their
indirectly ruled counterparts (the un’s hdis are based upon an amalgam of
health, knowledge, and standard of living measures) (Lange 2009). Lange’s
earlier collaboration with Mahoney and Vom Hau ‘revealed’ the deleterious
effects of Spanishmercantilist colonialism versus the liberal Britishmodel, but
also differentiated between direct and indirect varieties of the latter: ‘more
extensive British colonialism introduced a rule of law, effective administration,
and competitive markets, promoting development in the postcolonial period’
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while ‘limited forms of British colonialism distorted existing institutions in
ways that greatly hindered futuredevelopment’ (Lange,Mahoney andVomHau
2006:1414).
This argument is problematic, however, if Indonesia is compared with
Malaysia and Singapore. As Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau themselves rec-
ognize, the patchwork quilt of ex-colonial administration in today’s Malaysia
makes it awkward to classify it as either directly or indirectly ruled. There
were ‘very powerful legal-administrative institutions’ in the Straits Settlements
(including Singapore) and the Federated Malay States, but ‘much weaker’
equivalents in the Unfederated Malay States and northern Borneo (2006:1430,
1433 n. 10, 1444). Moreover, Hutchinson (2015) argues that Johor, one of the
most autonomous of the sultanates, achieved high levels of economic develop-
ment, while contributing a disproportionately large number of administrators
to Malaysia’s post-colonial ‘strong’ state.
Additionally, the Dutch ‘Ethical Policy’, launched in 1901, produced a more
interventionist form of rule in the Netherlands Indies compared to that in
the Malay states (both federated and unfederated), where a minimalist, colo-
nial, administrative tradition persisted until the SecondWorldWar.1 Economic
intervention by the Dutch state in the archipelago was of a higher order than
in ‘laissez-faire’ Malaya, reaching its zenith during the 1930s with food supply
regulations, commoditymarketing boards, and import-substitution industrial-
ization (isi).2TheNetherlands Indies’ structures transmogrified into ‘amonster
[…] of an all-powerful, all-directing economic bureaucracy’ in post-colonial
Indonesia (Dick 2002:162). For Malaysia, a dirigiste colonial regime, largely in
the context of counter-insurgency, only emerged from the late 1940s (White
2006:80–6; Hutchinson 2015:126, 150).
Yet, despite having a longer legacy of direct rule, post-colonial economic per-
formance in Indonesia lagged behind that of Malaysia and Singapore. Between
1960 and 1970—the un’s ‘development decade’—gdp per capita (measured
in 1985 us dollars) rose in Indonesia by a meagre 8.65%; in Singapore, by a
remarkable 81.5%; and inMalaysia, by amoremodest 40.7% (Booth 2007:169).
Indonesia can be regarded as ‘part of the Asian economic miracle’, experi-
encing sustained growth from the late 1960s, but it remains ‘a poor country
compared with some of its neighbours’ (Henley 2012: s26, s27–31; Henley, Tir-
tosudarmo and Fuady 2012: s52–3). According to the 2011 hdi, Singapore had
1 Ricklefs 1993:151–62; Moore 2015:233–4; Gullick 1992; Smith 1995:11–41.
2 LohW.L. 2002; Van Zanden andMarks 2012:138–9; Frankema 2015:268–9; Dick 2002:161–2, 180;
Knight 2015:170; Lindblad 2008:25–6.
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‘very high human development’, with a world ranking of 26; Malaysia achieved
‘high human development’ and took the 61st spot, while Indonesia managed
‘medium human development’ and was 124th in the global table.3 Indonesia
shed its ‘sick man of Southeast Asia’ image in the 2010s. Britain’s prime minis-
ter, David Cameron, arrived in Jakarta in April 2012, predicting that ‘Indonesia
[would] be a top ten economy’.4 Nevertheless, in 2015, Indonesia languished in
110th place in the global hdi table, with Singapore leaping to 11th, andMalaysia
dropping (slightly) to 62nd.5
By utilizing British late-colonial and post-colonial archives, as well as syn-
thesizing the existing literature on decolonization in maritime Southeast Asia,
this article argues that it was not so much the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century trajectory of colonialism that influenced post-colonial developments,
but rather the nature of the shorter-term decolonization transition after the
Second World War. Even within the small sample of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore, the various approaches to fdi, and the diverse performance of
the national economies which eventuated, owe much to the different ways in
which independencewas settled between the European imperial governments
and the Southeast Asian nationalist elites.
The Settlements Compared
The terms of Indonesia’s independence were settled at the Round Table Con-
ference (rtc) in The Hague in the autumn of 1949. The price of political
sovereignty for Indonesia was high: ‘Few, if any of the newly independent
nations were left with a more crushing external financial burden and such
severe limitations in economic policy-making’ (Thee 2010:38). In the Finan-
cieele en Economische Overeenkomst (Financial and Economic Agreement;
hereafter finec), Indonesia inherited the Netherlands Indies’ pre-Pacific War
foreign debt. This amounted to ƒ3.5 billion, repayable to the Dutch govern-
ment, and an additional ƒ 1.5 billion of external debt. Aus$100m loan, repayable
with interest, from the us Export-Import bank was poor compensation (Thee
2010:36; Round Table Conference 1950:34–5).
In contrast, in the financial settlement for independent Malaya in 1957,
Britain transferred unspent funds allocated for the expansion of the Feder-
3 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, Table 1, accessed 26-1-2012.
4 ‘David Cameron: Indonesia is a big opportunity for Britain’, Daily Telegraph, 11-4-2012.
5 http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI, Table 1, accessed 17-10-2016.
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ation’s armed forces and for development and welfare. Moreover, continued
assistance was provided post-independence towards the cost of the Emer-
gency—theundeclaredwar against theMalayanCommunist Party (mcp) guer-
rillas (Stockwell 1995a:lxxix). Up until 1961, at the lowest estimate, this repre-
sented a commitment fromHerMajesty’s Government of £27million.6 During
the creation of Malaysia in 1963, meanwhile, Britain agreed to provide a £7.5
million grant towards the economic development of Sarawak and Sabah (as
well as an interest-free loan of £5 million), and some £16.5 million to 1965 for
the raising of battalions in Borneo.7 In addition, the Anglo-Malayan Defence
Agreement of 1957, extended to Malaysia in 1963, allowed for the continued
presence of British troops and bases onMalayan/Malaysian soil. Kuala Lumpur
and Singapore were relieved of much of the cost of their external defence.8
This would come to the fore during Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia
between 1963 and 1966,whenover 60,000British service personnel, 200 aircraft,
and 80 naval vessels were deployed in Southeast Asia (Jones 2002). Moreover,
in the subsequent rundown of uk military forces, London provided compen-
satory aid—£50 million for Singapore; £25 million for Malaysia (Loh K.S. 2011;
White 2004:114).
A greater source of post-colonial tension between the Netherlands and
Indonesia, however, were those clauses in finec designed to preserve Dutch
business operations. Indonesia did receive the concessions of, ‘inclusionwithin
the earliest possible period of eligible Indonesians into the direction (andman-
agement) and staffs’ of overseas-controlled firms, ‘and cooperation in estab-
lishing training courses with the objective that after a reasonable period, the
predominant part of the leading staff personnel of the enterprises will con-
sist of Indonesian nationals’ (Round Table Conference 1950:28). But no targets
or deadlines were set for the Indonesianization of management. Moreover,
rights, concessions, and licences granted under the Netherlands Indies admin-
istration would be upheld, and could be renewed and extended, or new rights
granted, guaranteeing ‘a continuity’ and so ‘making possible the investments
required for normal long term business operations’. Moreover, ‘[e]xpropria-
tion, nationalization, liquidation, compulsory cession or transfer of properties
6 Telegram from Foreign Office, 4-2-1957, co 1030/494, The National Archives of the United
Kingdom (hereafter tna), in Stockwell 1995c:359–60.
7 Memorandumby Sandys, 11-6-1963, 134/2371, tna, cab 134/2371; Cabinet Oversea Policy Com-
mittee minutes, 17-6-1963 in Stockwell 2004b:503, 509–10.
8 Profumo to Macmillan, Appendix a, 12-8-1957, co 1030/833, tna in Stockwell 1995c:408–12;
Ormsby-Gore to Home, 15-2-1963, fo 371/169908, in Stockwell 2004b:445.
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or rights’ were only permitted if they could be proven in the public interest.
In the absence of agreement, compensation for such expropriations would
be determined by a judicial review based upon the real value of the assets
involved. Indonesian capital participation in foreign companies was encour-
aged, but only ‘subject to this being justified from a business point of view’.
Taxation, meanwhile, was to be set at a level to permit ‘normal replacements,
depreciations and reserves and permitting a reasonable profit for the capital
invested’. Dutch nationals and corporations would enjoy no less favourable
treatment in Indonesia than that accorded to any third country, and indeed
Indonesia was required to respect their ‘special interests’. Additionally, consul-
tation between The Hague and Jakarta was expected on exchange rates and
controls, and financial and monetary measures generally. Indonesia, mean-
while, could only place restrictions on transfers to the Netherlands of profits,
interest, andpensionpayments in viewof theRepublic’s foreign exchangeposi-
tion and in consultation with The Hague. There was also expected to be close
cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands on foreign trade policy,
and consideration of a ‘system of mutual preferential treatment’ (Round Table
Conference 1950:23–9, 31–2; Thee 2010:36–7). The rtc ‘more or less guaranteed
unrestricted operations by Dutch business enterprises in Indonesia’ (Van Zan-
den and Marks 2012:137). Consequently, there was a high degree of Indonesian
resentment towards ex-colonial firms. Amanager at theHongKong and Shang-
hai Banking Corporation (hsbc) recalled his time in Indonesia in 1956: ‘The
Dutch banks had a complete hold on practically all the major business in the
country, which annoyed the Indonesians.’9
As per post-colonial debt and aid arrangements, the uk government took
a different approach to post-colonial investment guarantees in Malaya. Far
from a ‘bargain’ being struck by British interests and the ‘Malayan elite’ in the
decolonization process to forestall nationalization (Jomo and Wee 2014:62–
3), the absence of any strings being attached at independence allowed the
Malayan/Malaysian state more room for manoeuvre and created much less
resentment towards so-called ‘neo-colonialism’ thanwas the case in the stormy
course of post-colonial Dutch–Indonesian relations.
Policymakers in London certainly came under pressure from metropolitan
business interests to institute guarantees similar to those afforded to their
Dutch colleagues in the archipelago. Malaya’s constitutional conference of
January–February 1956 fixed the date of full independence for August 1957.
Appended to the report of the conference was an extract from an address by
9 S.F.T.B. Lever interview, 20-8-1980, 1641/036, hsbc Group Archive, London.
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the high commissioner of Malaya to the Federal Legislative Council in Novem-
ber 1955 (Cmnd. 9714: Appendix f). This followed the election of the Alliance
government to share power with the remaining British colonials. The Malayan
Commercial Association of Great Britain (mcagb) objected to the high com-
missioner’s suggestions. ‘[F]air and considerate’ treatment would be given to
overseas capital, while the unobstructed remission of dividends and capital
would continue. Yet, in return, the Malayan government expected expatriate
enterprises to indigenize technical andmanagerial posts, reinvest a ‘reasonable
proportion’ of profits and, ‘whenever possible’, transfer the seat of direction to
Malaya. What worried the mcagb was that the Federation government might
force transfers of domicile to Kuala Lumpur, introduce employment quotas,
and restrict the entry of expatriates.Disputesmight erupt betweenuk investors
and theMalayan authorities regarding the qualifications required by local staff
as well as what the mcagb, in thinly veiled racist colonial jargon, called the
‘personal attributes of steadiness and calmness of judgment’.10
The businessmen argued that the absence of an economic agreementwould
make it ‘all the easier for a Government to disregard the interests of overseas
enterprises’. In July 1956, Malaya’s finance minister, H.S. Lee, was scheduled to
visit theuk tonegotiate the financial settlement for independence.Themcagb
hoped that a quid pro quo (protecting British firms in post-colonial Malaya)
could be extracted in return for continued uk aid post-1957.11
Cabinet ministers in London considered securing a binding undertaking
from Malaya to safeguard British investments before the talks in early 1956;
however, Whitehall mandarins advised against it. It was reasoned that a Neth-
10 Rubber Growers’ Association Council minutes, 4-6-1956, 24863/66, report of General Pur-
poses Committee, London Metropolitan Archive.
11 Rubber Growers’ Association Council minutes, 4-6-1956, 24863/66, report of General Pur-
poses Committee, London Metropolitan Archive. Although British business leaders in-
creasingly sang the praises of the Alliance government in public, behind closed doors
there remained concern as independence approached that the moderate Alliance could
easily beoverthrowngiven theongoingpresenceof militant leftismand/or Islamic revival-
ism (White 1996:147–8, 168). Meanwhile, there were worries that the Alliance itself har-
boured anti-capitalist tendencies. Immediately after the election results, in the summer
of 1955, rga leaders approached the Colonial Office alarmed at ‘reports from Malayan
sources that Alliance candidates in campaign pledged their Party to confiscation of Euro-
pean estates and their distribution to smallholders’. A feared bogeyman was Abdul Aziz
bin Ishak, the newminister for agriculture and leader of the left wing of theUnitedMalays
National Organization (umno). Telegram fromColonial Office toGovernor Singapore (for
MacKintosh from Poynton), 17-8-1955, fco 141/7479, tna.
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erlands–Indonesia, finec-style agreement might be later regarded as a limi-
tation on sovereignty; it might appear to question the Alliance government’s
integrity. In addition, it was said that the well-being of British firms in Malaya
hinged ‘upon the cultivation of good will’, not a ‘legal document’. Moreover, in
post-independent India, Pakistan, and Burma, British companies had encoun-
tered difficulties such as nationalization and punitive taxation, which could
not have been avoided by any such document. Crucially, ‘the sort of assurances
we could expect to secure in any formal agreement are not as valuable to us as
the recognition of mutual interest and the establishment of understanding and
cordial relations’. Instead, Conservative ministers were content with the inser-
tion of a paragraph in the final report which recognized assuring statements
in Alliance election manifestos, and a vague commitment to ‘fair and consid-
erate treatment’ to overseas capital. The report of the constitutional mission of
1957, moreover, rejected a post-colonial guarantee—it was not ‘right or prac-
ticable to attempt to limit developments of public opinion on political, social
and economic policy’.12
With regards to property rights, Article 13 of the Malayan/Malaysian consti-
tution stated that ‘no person shall be deprived of property save in accordance
with law’ and ‘no law shall provide for compulsory acquisition or use of prop-
ertywithout adequate compensation’. Yet, thiswas ‘adequate’ not ‘fair’ compen-
sation and there was no stipulation à la Indonesia that reimbursement should
be based on ‘real’ values (Trinidade and Lee 1986:193–5; Suffian 1976:220–1;
Groves 1978:34–5).Article 26of thedraft constitutionof theRepublik Indonesia
Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) stated that ‘[e]xpropria-
tion of any property or right for the general benefit cannot take place except
with indemnification and in accordancewith regulations as established by law’
(Round Table Conference 1950: Appendix 9). This was equally as vague, then,
as the situation in Malaya/Malaysia. However the latter was not required to
also provide finec-style investment guarantees. Moreover, Singapore deleted
Article 13 from its constitution after leaving Malaysia in 1965. Nevertheless, the
Peoples’ Action Party (pap) government pursued an export-orientated manu-
facturing strategy. Singaporean post-colonial capitalism was highly planned,
involving a myriad of government-linked corporations. But the pap’s ‘state-
coordinated, liberal market economy’ nurtured capital and technology inputs
from multinational enterprises, and did not nationalize foreign-owned firms
(Ritchie 2009:437; Huff 1994:299–360). Paradoxically, in 1971, it was the inde-
12 White 1996:142, 172–3; Draft cabinet memorandum by Lennox-Boyd, c. Feb 1956, co 1030/
72, tna, in Stockwell 1995c:257–8.
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pendent Singaporean government, not the departing imperial regime, which
instituted an investment guarantee for British firms.13
Admittedly, both Malaysia and Singapore suffered financial and monetary
constraints through their continued membership of the sterling area and the
linking of their currencies to the uk pound until the early 1970s (and this, as we
will see, was a major problem for Anglophone Southeast Asia, as the British
economy floundered from the mid 1960s). But the sterling-area system was
liberalized by Malaya’s independence in 1957. Malaya won self-determination
in dollar expenditure after the January–February 1956 powwow in London.
Import restrictions on dollar goods were lifted steadily throughout the ster-
ling area, with the eventual goal of full convertibility. After 1959, Singapore
merchant houses were able to do substantial business directly with North
America, and from 1960, Malaya began accumulating its own, independent
dollar reserve. Moreover, the ongoing financial link to Britain did not prevent
the Federation from concluding most-favoured-nation trade deals outside the
Commonwealth bloc—notably with Japan in 1960. By 1965–1966, Japan was
Malaysia’smain tradingpartner, aswell as amajor supplier of capital andknow-
how for the country’s industrialization process (Sutton 2015:150–1, 170–1;White
2010:156, 161–70).
Why did the Netherlands and Britain take these different approaches to
the decolonization settlements? One reason why the British did not insist on
investment guarantees was that the Malaysian region was declining in eco-
nomic significance for theuk (as indicatedby financial liberalization).Malaya’s
dollar earnings from massive sales of rubber and tin to the United States were
crucial to British reconstruction after the Second World War, and (combined
with Singapore’s role as the outer ring of defence for Australasia) explain the
uk’s determination to crush the mcp after 1948 (Sutton 2015; Stockwell 1986).
However, by themid 1950s, Britain’s dollar crisis was less pronounced, and new
trade and investment strategies were drawing uk businesses away from the
Empire/Commonwealth towards Europe, Japan, and the United States. Mean-
while, the development of a synthetic rubber industry in the uk made Britain
less reliant on Malayan raw-material supplies (White 2010:155, 158). The inde-
pendence of Indonesia, however, came at a time when the Dutch viewed the
archipelago’s raw-material supplies and hard-currency earnings as crucial to
metropolitan reconstruction. Such economic imperatives had underpinned
the ‘police actions’ of 1947–1948 against the Republic. But, as Van der Eng
(1988:336–7, 347–52) argues, the acceptance of independence by the Dutch
13 Stone to Morse, 22-2-1971, ov 44/244, Bank of England Archive, London (hereafter BoE).
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cabinet in The Hague was also conditioned by a confidence that the Dutch
economic stake in Indonesia could be secured by meeting Republican consti-
tutional demands, while also preserving us Marshall Aid disbursements to the
Netherlands.
In its exits from Malaysia and Singapore, Britain benefited from an inheri-
tance of decolonization: it was able to learn from the mistakes of the Ameri-
can Revolution in the late eighteenth century and from the setting up of self-
government for the settler colonies in the nineteenth century (Boyce 1999:21–
43). The examples of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and even
the Irish Free State/Eire (after 1922) demonstrated that a loosening of formal
ties need not mean the end of metropolitan economic influence (Hopkins
2008; Jeffery 2011:328). The term first used byBritish officials for a self-governing
Malaysia was the ‘British dominion of Southeast Asia’, suggesting that the uk
was expecting Malaysia to follow the ‘White’ Commonwealth model of influ-
ence through devolution (Stockwell 2004a:xxvii). This experience was lack-
ing in the Dutch Empire. À Campo (1998:37) argues that the smoother eco-
nomic transition in India after independence, compared to Indonesia, reflected
Britain’smore ‘flexible and pragmatic’ approach to ‘empire-building and decol-
onization’.
But this stress on British ‘exceptionalism’ has been questioned in compara-
tive analyses of decolonization (Thomas, Moore and Butler 2015:332–45). The
British were as determined to reconstruct their Southeast Asian empire post-
war as the Dutch. The Malayan Union (and later Federation), like the Dutch
federal scheme for Indonesia, was designed to prolong the colonial presence,
as were the overarching structures of the reformed imperialism—the Dutch
and British multi-racial commonwealths. When local political groups refused
to accept these ‘partnerships’, the British were equally prepared to use extreme
violence and engage in human-rights abuses to secure what were considered
vital economic interests formetropolitan revival. The offensive against themcp
should not be regarded as distinct from the Dutch ‘police actions’ in Indonesia
(White 2011).
Short-term exigencies therefore remain more important than long-term
inheritances. The timing of devolution proved crucial in explaining differing
British and Dutch attitudes towards their Southeast Asian territories. Britain’s
declining economic interest inMalaya/Malaysia by the second half of the 1950s
made independence, without financial and investment strings attached, pos-
sible to contemplate. For the Netherlands in the late 1940s, Indonesia was
perceived as crucial to economic survival. Indeed, as Holland argued, Dutch
acquiescence to Indonesian and us pressure in surrendering Irian Jaya by the
early 1960s was made that much easier by the ‘new assets and opportunities’
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of the post-colonial era: ‘the rich revenue from North Sea gas strikes and the
prosperity generated by the drive towards west European integration’ (Holland
1985:93).
It should still be remembered, however, that the British decolonization
strategy for Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore—just like the Dutch strategy for
Indonesia—was predicated on the belief that a large slice of economic, mili-
tary, and cultural influence could be preserved in the post-colonial state (Stock-
well 1986; Subritzky 2000:211, 212–3). Where the Dutch differed was that they
were much more explicit about their influence as a result of both finec and
their clinging on toWest New Guinea.
Consequences for Foreign Investment
The restrictions placed on the freedom of manoeuvre in post-colonial Indone-
sia made it much easier for malcontents to critique the ongoing plural econ-
omy. The drawn-out decolonization processes in Malaysia and Singapore
resulted in the isolation of the extreme left. The Emergency on the mainland
after 1948 marginalized the economic radicals as the Malay left was lumped
together with the overseas, Chinese-dominated mcp. The leftist and pro-Indo-
nesian Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (pkmm, Malay Nationalist Party)
was not banned after the declaration of the Emergency. Nevertheless, Ikatan
Pemuda Tanah Ayer (peta, Youth League of the Fatherland), an offshoot of its
militant youthwing, was proscribed by the colonial authorities, and prominent
pkmm leaders were detained or took to the jungle alongside the mcp guerril-
las (White 1996:138–9; Harper 1999:124–6).14 The traditionalist umno emerged
instead as the champion of the kampung, and after 1953 its aristocratic leader-
ship formally allied with communal parties dominated by ethnic Chinese and
Indian business leaders (Amoroso 2014:211–28). Despite British fears that the
election of the Alliance in 1955 might herald an Indonesian-style rapproche-
ment with the communists, the Baling Talks in December resulted in Chin
Peng, leader of the mcp, returning to the jungle rather than becoming a mem-
ber of parliament (Stockwell 1995a:lxxvi). In Singapore, Operation Coldstore
in February 1963 incarcerated the radical left-wing challenge to the moderate
socialist, Lee Kuan Yew (Jones 2002:118). The ‘patriotic’ factor during the Kon-
frontasi (Confrontation) with Indonesia bolstered the position of the Alliance
14 Supplement to Malayan Security Service Political Intelligence Journal, 15-8-1948, co 537/
3753, tna, reproduced in Stockwell 1995b:53–65.
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government in the 1964 elections. A new state of emergency also led to the
arrest of pro-Indonesian radicals (Means 1976:338, 340–1).
Despite the abortiveMadiun uprising of 1948, the Partai Komunis Indonesia
(pki, Indonesian Communist Party) and the leftist wing of the Partai Nasional
Indonesia (pni, Indonesian National Party) were not eliminated in either the
war with the Dutch or the internecine struggles of the Revolution. Rather,
these radical groups, which had called for sequestrations of foreign-owned
assets during the independence struggle,were given succour by theDutch ‘neo-
colonial’ presence (Stoler 1985:104). In Indonesia’s first national parliamentary
elections in September 1955, the pki won 16%of the vote (concentrated in East
and Central Java). Following the de-Dutchification of trade and investment,
and the institution of Guided Democracy, the pki was indirectly incorporated
into the regime as President Sukarno adopted its key tenets in his nasakom
philosophy, and attempted to exploit the communists as a counterweight to
the military (Cribb 2000:163, 166).
In 1950, the Barisan Tani Indonesia (bti, Indonesian Peasant Front), partic-
ularly active in the plantations and affiliated to the pki, declared that, ‘Indone-
sia is a tool serving the restoration of the old order in a new form. Foreign
capital still controls Indonesia’s mines, plantations, factories, land-, sea- and
air-transport facilities.’ The bti was committed to the nationalization of for-
eign enterprises, and the redistribution of plantations to the landless (Pelzer
1982:56–7, 58–9). Unionized estate workers supported the Republic in the vio-
lent struggles of the late 1940s. They made spectacular wage gains in the early
1950s, but became increasingly alienated from the Jakarta government by a fail-
ure to challenge ‘the basic relations of production on which exploitation was
based’ (Stoler 1985:111–23, 126, 127).15 Indeed, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, minis-
ter of finance in 1950–1951 and first governor of the Bank Indonesia, blamed
strikes, thefts, lootings, and the burning of estate crops for the declining pro-
ductivity of foreign-exchange-earningplantations (Thee 2010:42).However, the
pragmatic moderates, who were prepared to tolerate foreign investment in
the medium-term, became isolated in central government. In the late 1950s,
Sjafruddin, aswell as SumitroDjojohadikusumo (aminister of trade and indus-
try and twiceminister of finance in the first half of the 1950s), joined a rebellion
inWest Sumatra against Sukarno (Thee 2010:40).
15 Port workers had a similar experience, achieving wage increases ‘out of proportion’ in
the 1950s, but also being at the forefront of labour confrontations with foreign-owned
shipping companies. À Campo 1998:29, 34; White 2012:1288–9, 1302–3; ‘Djakarta. Jan–Mar
1965’, Holt to Gleichman, 15-3-1965, oa/1869/2, Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool,
Ocean Archives (hereafter oa).
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Frustrations with the ex-imperial economic presence were compounded by
the entrenchment of the Dutch in Irian Jaya after 1949. Pragmatic business
interests forewarned of the dangers—Dutch relations with Indonesia were
likely to be irreparably damaged by continued possession of the Papuan ter-
ritory. For Anglo-Dutch Unilever, a power-sharing agreement in Irian Jaya for
a further 25 years between the Netherlands and Indonesia would relieve ten-
sions (Penders 2002:218, 347; Lindblad 2008:161; White 2012:1307–8). But the
government in The Hague ignored the soap and food manufacturer’s advice.
When talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands collapsed in February
1956, Jakarta unilaterally withdrew from the Netherlands–Indonesian Union
and repudiated finec (Pelzer 1982:127). European enterprises noted a tighten-
ing of the screw. The Liverpool-based Ocean Steam Ship Company (OSSCo)
(also known as the Blue Funnel Line) was the largest British shipping inter-
est in Southeast Asia, with a Dutch subsidiary, the Nederlandsche Stoom-
vaartMaatschappij ‘Oceaan’ (nsmo). nsmo’swharves in Jakarta,Makassar, and
Surabaya now had to be operated by Indonesian companies.16 At the end of
November 1957, Indonesia’s request to the un General Assembly to have the
issue of the surrender of West New Guinea put on the agenda of the Security
Council failed to achieve the two-thirds majority required. From 3 December
1957, Dutch firms were ‘held responsible for everything that was going wrong’,
taken over by trade unions, and quickly placed under military supervision
(Lindblad 2008:182–5; Lindblad 2010:104).
The British, by contrast, relinquished North Borneo/Sabah, Sarawak, and
Singapore in the creation of Malaysia in 1963. The departure of Singapore from
the enlarged Federation in August 1965 was not a British neo-colonial plot. It
was a locally agreed deal, which the British government only became aware
of when the split was a fait accompli.17 Singapore’s exit looked disastrous to
British economic interests, because the micro-state might fall under Indone-
sian or Communist Chinese influence, while the interconnections of mainland
and island would be shattered (White 2004:42–6). Similarly, British interests
did not engineer Brunei’s refusal to join Malaysia back in 1963. Both the British
government and Royal Dutch Shell regarded a British-protected Brunei as an
international embarrassment, andhighly vulnerable to Indonesian irredentism
(Stockwell 2004a:lxxxiii–iv;White 2004:46–8). The uk andMalaysia continued
to consult on Brunei’s progress towards independence. uk diplomats appreci-
16 Blue Funnel and Glen Lines Staff Bulletin, July 1956:171–2, oa/696/2.
17 Prime Minister Harold Wilson cut short his holiday on the Scilly Isles to review the
‘potentially dangerous problem’ (Wilson 1971:130–1).
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ated in 1977 the danger to Britain’s stake in Malaysia ‘if the negotiations with
Brunei turned sour or [went] too slowly’.18
Britain’s acquiescence in the creation of Malaysia (as well as its non-inter-
ference in Singapore’s departure or Brunei’s rejection) reinforced the authority
of moderate policymakers in Anglophone Southeast Asia. In the Indonesian
case, however, Thee (2003:20) believed that ‘themajor reason for the decline in
political influence of [the pragmatic economic policymakers] was the refusal
of the Dutch to discuss the future status of West Irian and the continuing
economic domination of Dutch business’. In justifying the nationalization of
Dutch assets in 1959, Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo told the press that ‘the
Indonesian-Dutch dispute overWest Irian […] precipitated the decolonization
process of Indonesia’s economy. […] [T]he country’s economic structure had
remained colonialist in spite of the political freedom. The Dutch still retained
their economic privileges and the Indonesian economy was still under their
control’ (Pelzer:170).
Nationalization rapidly increased the presence of state-owned enterprises
in the economy, with ‘a much more “socialist” approach to economic prob-
lems’ since ‘there was now much less concern about discouraging foreign
investment’. Under Sukarno’s Guided Economy, the Foreign Investment Law of
1958 (Undang-Undang tentang Penanaman Modal Asing, uu 78/1958), which
encouraged joint ventures but continued to permit transfers of profits and div-
idends, was overridden (Thee 1996:321, 328). In the opposite direction,Malaya’s
prime minster, Tunku Abdul Rahman, called for an international charter to
attract foreign capital throughout Asia (White 2004:60). Indeed,Malaysian pol-
icymakers, like their Singaporean counterparts, were careful not to disturb
existing trade and investment channels through new initiatives. Hence in 1968,
British bankers and traders were reassured by officials from Malaysia’s central
bank (Bank Negara) that new exchange controls would be introduced in such
a way as to avoid disruption of ‘the special position of London as a financial
and trading centre for Malaysian produce’ (whereas, between 1958 and 1965,
Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises bypassed the commoditymarkets in Ams-
terdam and Rotterdam in favour of Antwerp, Bremen, and Hamburg, and also
tried to trade increasingly with the communist bloc).19
18 Cortazzi to Simons, 23-3-1977, 15/2237, fco 15/2237, tna.
19 Note by McCulloch, 12-2-1968, in Kuala Lumpur to London, 16-2-1968, 37612/8, London
Metropolitan Archive, Harrisons & Crosfield Ltd (hereafter h&c); Memorandum of meet-
ing with Amien Tjokrosuseno, ppn Baru in Hobhouse to Holt, 25-10-1958, oa/2385; Lind-
blad 2008:188; White 2012:1300.
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This patience was all themore remarkable given that Anglo-Malaysian (and
Anglo-Singaporean) relations encountered a rocky patch between 1967 and
1972, from thedevaluation to the float of sterling.Malaysia’sminister of finance,
Tan Siew Sin, was repeatedly assured by the chancellor of the exchequer, James
Callaghan, that there was no question of devaluation. Malaysia, the second-
largest government holder of sterling assets after Australia, took a huge hit
therefore in November 1967, losing m$250million (us$81.5 million). Singapore
was less exposed, having clandestinely diversified its reserves before devalua-
tion to about 50% sterling (whereas Malaysia still held 80%). However, in Jan-
uary 1968, when HaroldWilson announced an acceleratedmilitary withdrawal
from ‘East of Suez’, both countries suffered a second trauma inducedby theuk’s
financial crisis. The sterling float of June 1972 made a triple whammy, costing
Singapore s$45million (us$16million) andMalaysiam$59million (us$21mil-
lion) (Schenk 2008:203, 219; White 2004:112). Tan denounced the float as a ‘de
facto devaluation’ and a unilateral dismantling of the sterling area.20 Britain’s
imminent entry into the eec alsoworried Singapore andMalaysia—not from a
trade perspective, but because there would be less uk investment and lending
to go round.21
Yet, in contrast to Indonesia in the 1950s, anger was vented in Malaysia
and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s at the ex-colonial power’s incapacity to
contribute to economic development rather than its alleged neo-colonialism.
Britain was censured for doing too little rather than too much, and there was
minimal retaliation against British interests. The uk’s refusal to provide addi-
tional military aid for Malaysia post-1966 led to the withdrawal of Common-
wealth preferences on British imports, contributing to a significant downturn
in British trade with Malaysia (White 2004:8–10, 207). Post-1972, Malaysia and
Singapore adopted the us dollar as their intervention currency, and Malaysia
abrogated its sterling-area agreement and diversified widely into other Euro-
pean currencies (tomatch Singapore). Yet, neither country instituted exchange
controls against the ex-sterling area.22Moreover, the Bank of Englandwas con-
fident that Malaysia would not nationalize British interests. Decision makers
in Kuala Lumpur were ‘far too interested in private direct inward investment
in general’.23 Rather, regret was expressed that Britain could hardly look after
itself let alone act as the economic head of the Commonwealth. Tan Siew Sin
20 Negotiating brief: Malaysia, 5-7-1972, ov 44/245, BoE.
21 Stone to Haslam, 15-1-1971, ov 44/244, BoE.
22 Hopcroft to Chick, 11-8-1972; Peskett for Stone, 27-10-1972; Stone for Payton, 27-6-1972 and
11-7-1972, ov 44/245, BoE.
23 Stone for Fenton, 8-11-1972, ov 44/244, BoE.
the settlement of decolonization 223
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 173 (2017) 208–241
complained in April 1972 to a uk Treasury official about a British rate of infla-
tion ‘normally associated with a developing country’, trade unions that were
‘as powerful as the Government’, and a dangerous predilection for ‘stop-go eco-
nomics’.24 In June 1977, Malaysia’s prime minister, Hussein Onn, lamented to
David Owen, the uk’s foreign secretary, that Britain
was losing ground in Malaysia in the commercial field. There was pro-
found goodwill for the British and respect for the quality of British prod-
ucts, but the Britishwere just not aggressive enough, in respect not only of
Japanese competition but the increasing involvement of the French and
now theWest Germans.25
After 1966, barDutch enterprises, the Soeharto regime in Indonesia did encour-
age the return of foreign investments sequestered during Konfrontasi on
favourable terms (White 2012:1312). New waves of fdi from American, Euro-
pean, and East Asian mnes were actively sought out. Yet, the Orde Baru (New
Order) was not necessarily that new. Many of its administrators cut their teeth
during the Sukarno years. Soeharto himself was a veteran of the guerrilla war
against the Dutch, much of which had been directed at sabotage of Dutch
and other foreign-owned enterprises (Van Zanden andMarks 2012:137; Henley,
Tirtosudarmo and Fuady 2012: s67). By 1967, a former favourite of Sukarno’s,
Brigadier Ali Sadikin, was the governor of Jakarta. As minister of sea commu-
nications, he had railed in 1964 against the Europe–Indonesia shipping con-
ference as a ‘tool of imperialist domination’.26 Moreover, the reservation of
government cargo to Indonesian-registered ships (dating from Sadikin’s time
in Sukarno’s cabinet) continued until 1985 (White 2012:1314).
Equating foreign investmentwith colonialismwas a difficult notion to shake
off for the Orde Baru elite. Despite the counter-revolutionary nature of Soe-
harto’s agricultural development, these pro-poor programmes ‘reflected a his-
tory in which the ideal of social justice […] played a powerful role’ (Henley,
Tirtosudarmo and Fuady 2012: s67). George Holt, the Indonesia specialist on
the OSSCo board, visited Jakarta in 1967 and reported on a widespread dis-
trust of communist-style institutions; however, ‘[s]ocialism still remain[ed] the
ideal’. Holt hoped that ‘a good deal of the complicated socializing legislation
24 Meeting with Raymond Bell, 13-4-1972, ov 44/245, BoE.
25 Note by South East Asia Department, 21-6-1977, 15/2237, fco 15/2237, tna.
26 Notes by Holt, 20-4-1967 and 11-3-1969, oa/jla/20/1; Confidential translation, 13-11-1964,
oa/1696/2.
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of the previous regime will be swept away’.27 Yet, five years later, Ocean direc-
tors were informed that ‘[i]nvestment in Indonesia remains complicated by
Government regulations and bureaucratic procedures’ (including widespread
corruption—another hangover from the Sukarno era).28
Indeed, with economic stabilization boosted by oil revenues, a Sukarno-
esque form of economic nationalism resurfaced in the 1970s. Local equity
participation requirements were pushed to 51%, the employment of foreign
personnel was restricted, and tax incentives were also declined. The pragmatic
‘Berkeley mafia’ of economists only reasserted their authority in the 1980s (Hill
1998:30–1; Weinstein 1974:279–80, 281, 284–5; Henley, Tirtosudarmo and Fuady
2012: s54–55). In 1967, Holt found the Soeharto regime appreciative of the fact
that ‘its survival depends upon [overseas] aid and credit […], and that they
will only get them if they can inspire confidence’.29 But in 1976 Indonesia’s
risk-rating remained high. The leading Britishmerchant bank, Barings, advised
Ocean against tying up sizeable assets in a project to ship liquid natural gas
from Indonesia to Japan. This was partly due to technological imponderables,
but also because of the ‘political risk’ involved.30
In Malaysia, meanwhile, the New Economic Policy (nep) was being intro-
duced. It was designed to nurture a Malay—or bumiputera—managerial and
entrepreneurial class, while also increasing the share of the corporate economy
owned by non-MalayMalaysians. The consequence was ‘a great increase in the
formation of quasi-public bodies and government agencies that were charged
with providing special assistance programmes for Malays or that acted as sur-
rogate institutions for the transfer of capital shares and ownership to Malays’
(Means 1991:25–6). During 1975, the encroachments of Malaysian parastatals
and ethnic Chinese investors into the ownership of British plantation andmin-
ing groups, the insistence by Malaysian officials that British firms reserve at
least 30% of their equity in Malaysia for bumiputera interests, and amend-
ments to petroleum legislation led to a significant blip in foreign-investor confi-
dence.31Yet, there remained ‘no signof a governmental desire to deprivepeople
of property, whether by nationalization or otherwise, without adequate com-
pensation’ (Sheridan 1977:17, cited in Trinidade and Lee 1986:193).
In September 1981, a dawn raidwas launched on the London Stock Exchange
on the premiere British plantation group, The Guthrie Corporation. Guthrie
27 Note by Holt, 20-4-1967, oa/jla/20/1.
28 Board memorandum, 20-8-1973, Appendix 5–6, oa/862.
29 Note by Holt, 20-4-1967, oa/jla/20/1.
30 Taylor to Alexander, 12-7-1976, oa/2412/5.
31 Material in tna, fco 15/2075–2076.
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was swiftly taken into Malaysian control. The raid resulted in tense relations
between London andKuala Lumpur, culminating in PrimeMinisterMahathir’s
‘Buy British Last’ campaign. This hit uk consultants and contractors hard.32
Nevertheless, Permodalan Nasional Berhad (pnb, the National Equity Corpo-
ration), the quasi-governmental Malaysian investment agency, was scrupulous
in its observation of stock exchange rules during the takeover of Guthrie. This
avoided charges of nationalization to fortify overseas business confidence.
Moreover, amicable Anglo-Malaysian relations were restored relatively swiftly.
If British firms complied with the requirements of the nep, uk investment was
still embraced. Should British interests be localized, expatriate managers were
assured of continuity of employment (Shakila and White 2010:937–40, 941–4,
955–6). The chairman of pnb told the British high commissioner in July 1982
that ‘whilst inmany cases titular control forMalaysianswas important for polit-
ical reasons, day to day control of management was quite another’.33
The Malay chauvinists, who now dominated umno, believed in majority
local control of resource-based industries. This did not mean that multina-
tional enterprises were eschewed, though. In the Korean- and Taiwanese-style
Free Trade Zones, fdi was sought out in export-orientated manufacturing.
Much of this sector remained foreign-owned until the twenty-first century
(Shakila and White 2010:955; Jomo and Wee 2014:16–7, 46). British investment
in high-technology industries, especially where there was a potential regional
export market and local raw materials were being exploited, was still encour-
aged. Mahathir’s bark proved worse than his bite—at the height of his anti-
British campaign, in 1982, the prime minister welcomed a project for the man-
ufacture of cement building-board. Though a joint venture between a uk firm
and a bumiputera group, the former held 80%of the equity. TheMalay holding
would be increased to 40% by 1990 to comply with the nep, butMahathir ‘very
much hoped’ this would be achieved by expansion rather than by divestment
on the part of Shand Kydd, the British partner. A Foreign & Commonwealth
Officemandarin remindedhis colleagues that uk firms could still establishnew
enterprises inMalaysiawith amajority shareholding in their favour, ‘something
that is denied us in many other parts of the developing world’.34
Malaysianization was a gradual process. The indigenization of Dutch enter-
prises in the late 1950s was accompanied by a mass expulsion of 50–60,000
Dutch personnel from Indonesia. There was no equivalent exodus in Malaysia.
32 White to Brown, 30-9-1982, 15/3268, fco 15/3268, tna.
33 Note by Bentley, 2-7-1982, 15/3268, fco 15/3268, tna.
34 Bentley to London, 18-8-1982, 15/3268, fco 15/3268, tna.
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From 1963 onwards, it was difficult for British enterprises to employ European
managers. Nevertheless, the authorities remained flexible—a number of ‘key
posts’ were retained by expatriates where those managers were deemed to
be directly responsible to the boards of overseas companies. In 1968, a Plan-
tation Industry Malaysianization Committee (pimc) was established and an
industry-wide standard for ‘top-echelon’ representation was agreed with the
government.35 Claude Fenner, the special representative in Malaysia of the
British-dominated Rubber Growers’ Association (rga), was chair of the pimc,
emphasizing Anglo-Malaysian continuities in the post-colonial period. Fen-
ner had been the last British commissioner of police of the Federation of
Malaysia, and the first inspector-general of police for Malaysia until 1966. His
appointment to the rga position was supported by senior Malaysian leaders.
On Fenner’s death in Malaysia in 1978, the British high commissioner in Kuala
Lumpur acknowledged that, through the Malaysianization agreements, ‘the
change over to Malaysian management on estates has been smooth, orderly
and unembittered [sic]’. Fenner was given a funeral with full police honours.
As the high commissioner reflected:
There can be few ex-Colonies where the praise for an ex-Colonial Service
officer has been so generously and publicly given […] there is apprecia-
tion for the smooth way in which we organised the transfer of power—
especially when compared with neighbours like Indonesia.36
Where failings were revealed in indigenization, policymakers in Kuala Lumpur
were not averse to rectifying these by continuing to call on British expertise.
After 1960, with political support from the highest level, and the wresting
of government accounts from the uk exchange banks, Malayan Banking Ltd
(Maybank) emerged as the Federation’s largest local bank (White 2004:78). But
Maybank ran into liquidity difficulties in the course of 1965–1966 due to unwise
lending. Bank Negara provided financial assistance and by 1971 owned 49%
of Maybank’s shares. Moreover, an expatriate general manager was seconded
from National & Grindlays, the British exchange bank, and Bank Negara was
prepared to permit Grindlays a 15% shareholding in Maybank.37
A smooth transition from the colonial to the national, and ongoing ‘collabo-
ration’ (rather than Indonesian-style ‘confrontation’), between former impe-
35 h&c (Malaysia) to London, 14-8-1968, enclosing record of meeting at Ministry of Home
Affairs, 6-3-1968, 37599, h&c.
36 Hawley to Secretary of State, 23-6-1978, fco 15/2356, tna.
37 Extract from brief for visit to Malaysia, May 1971, ov 44/244, BoE.
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rial power and post-colonial elites, is illustrated by the final British military
rundown in Singapore. Loh K.S. (2011:188) argues that the ‘departing British
themselves contributed significantly’ to the growth of manufacturing, trans-
port, and tourism in the hand-over of facilities. Three-quarters of the funding
was tied to British goods and services (LohK.S. 2011:189–90;White 2004:114), but
the converted bases permitted the development of Singaporean industries dur-
ing the 1970s—a commercial shipyard, an international airport, an engineering
facility for electrical equipment, and tourist and recreational resorts.Moreover,
the transition programme facilitated new educational provision: the relocation
of the University of Singapore campus and a new technical college. In this,
Singapore was glad to be able to utilize the expertise of the ex-colonials—in
the transformation of the naval base into a commercial shipyard, British ship-
builders provided the know-how (Loh K.S. 2011:192, 194).
Indeed, throughout the transfer process, Lee Kuan Yew’s regime remained
alert to maintaining foreign-investor confidence (Loh K.S. 2011:189). Protests
fromBritish firms had accompanied the announcement of an acceleratedmili-
tarywithdrawal (White 2004:108–11). Hence, in tandemwith the rundown, both
an investment guarantee for British companies and employment legislation
to introduce a new labour discipline were announced. Retrained base work-
ers acted as ‘the vanguard of an adaptable national workforce spearheading
the island’s venture into manufacturing in the 1970s’ (Loh K.S. 2011:195). As Loh
concludes:
the accelerated British withdrawal was not only the final chapter of
decolonisation in Singapore, but also the first step in the independent
city state’s growth. […] The programmes of national development and
social engineering, enabled by Anglo-Singaporean collaboration during
the withdrawal, spurred the transformation of the island state into an
international industrial hub (Loh K.S. 2011:200–1).
Consequences for Economic Performance
In contrast, most historians agree that Indonesia’s sudden confrontational rup-
ture with the Netherlands had negative consequences through the dislocation
of supply chains and the exposure of chronic skills and capital deficits (Booth
1998:316, 2007:173; Lindblad 2010:105; Van Zanden and Marks 2012:149). The
archipelago’s poor economic performance vis-à-vis the peninsula was noted
contemporaneously. Malaya’s deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, told
President Kennedy in April 1963 that ‘the Indonesians were seriously con-
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cerned about the contrast between the record of prosperity and success which
Malaya had achieved since independence and the series of mistakes and diffi-
culties which had beset Indonesia’.38
Marks and Van Zanden explicitly link Indonesia’s woes to its ‘troublesome
economic decolonization’, especially through their case studies of inter-insular
shipping. The expulsion of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (kpm,
Royal Packet Company) from Indonesianwaters after 1958 resulted in amarked
decline in productivity. Its successor Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia (pelni,
Indonesian National Shipping), which attempted to fill the gap left by kpm,
lacked organizational skills and know-how. By 1960 pelni was half as produc-
tive as kpm in the 1950s. Inefficiencies in infrastructure had knock-on effects:
‘fragmentedmarkets’ […] ‘harmed economic growth’ as economies of scale and
specialization patterns between Java and the Outer Islands disintegrated. The
absence of an ‘integrated market’, as long established networks between trad-
ing and shipping companies were disrupted, led to ‘extreme temporal price
fluctuations’ (Marks 2010:81–2, 91; Van Zanden and Marks 2012:162, 164).39
This analysis is supported by the experiences of British trading and shipping
interests. Being British-owned, Maclaine, Watson & Co (mw), Blue Funnel’s
agents in Jakarta, dodged the first round of sequestrations (though the mer-
chant house fell prey to thewave of anti-British takeovers in 1964).mw reported
in late 1960 on pelni’s ‘staggering’ losses of Rp. 734 million.40 This was not a
problem of supply. Gaps arising from the release of 40 kpm vessels seized by
the Indonesian government were quickly filled.Whereas pelni had 38 ships in
1957, it possessed 91 by March 1960 (À Campo 1998:26, 34–5). Rather, the head
of Djakarta Lloyd (dl), Indonesia’s government-owned ocean-going shipping
line, ‘bemoaned’ pelni’s ‘lack of trained personnel’.41
pelni’s operations were hindered also by port congestion and delivery
delays due to the inefficiencies of the bhakti, the nine state-owned trading
houses which succeeded the Dutch import-export firms, winning monopoly
rights to three-quarters of Indonesia’s imports in April 1959 (Van Zanden and
Marks 2012:149). mw reported to Liverpool in February 1960 that ‘all was not
well with the State enterprises’—a sad manifestation of which was the failure
38 ForeignRelations of theUnited States, 1961–1963, xxiii,Doc. 331.Memorandumof Conver-
sation,Washington, 24-4-1963, available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1961-63v23/d331, accessed 22-11-2016.
39 Disruptions in transport between Java and Sumatra also led to an acute labour shortage
on the Deli plantation belt, a crucial earner of foreign exchange (Stoler 1985:149).
40 ‘Djakarta: Oct. 60–Feb. 61’, Spreckley to Holt, 19-12-1960, oa/1869/1.
41 Discussion between Holt and Kosasih, 26-3-1960, oa/1869.
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to supply textile orders in time for Lebaran (the Indonesian term for the Eid fes-
tival, when new clothes and footwear are traditionally purchased by celebrants
and the bazaars are usually full of shoppers).42 On a visit to Indonesia in 1961,
Holt reported it was ‘not unknown’ on quaysides to observe ‘a once valuable
piece of machinery or equipment with its wooden case literally decomposing
about it’.43 In Surabaya and Semarang, a ministerial inspection party discov-
ered in the summer of 1962 that machinery, textiles, and construction materi-
als had been lying idle in warehouses for two years.44 Such blockages pushed
up costs. Because ships frequently left port with unfilled space, freight rates
had to be increased. pelni bumped rates by 100–200% between 1957 and 1961
alone.45
Economic difficulties grew also out of the Indonesianization of deep-sea
shipping through the exclusion of Dutch liners by 1960. New freight confer-
ences were established, led by Britain’s OSSCo and Indonesia’s dl. By 1963,
the latter was taking about 20% of the cargo from Europe and 15% on return
voyages.46 dl faced a steep learning curve in transforming froma tramporgani-
zation, chartering vessels, to owning and running scheduled liners as a general
carrier. Break-bulk shippingwas a sophisticated art form, relying upon an inter-
locking network of agents, brokers, forwarders, insurers, exchange banks, and
shippers, as well as shipping companies, maintained by relationships of trust
over vast distances (Miller 2012:146–75).With the Dutch merchant firms out of
the picture, dl utilized the services of the Indonesian state’s freight forwarding
organization (Badan Muatan Indonesia [bmi]). bmi’s managers were inexpe-
rienced but also tended to discriminate against foreign shipping interests in
giving dl first call on cargoes, a situation which the uk’s Ministry of Transport
representative in Singapore believed ‘would only land Indonesia in extra costs
and handicap her trade’.47
dl’s early dabbling in the Indonesia–Europe trade was not a success. Nor-
man Etherington, the un’s shipping adviser to Indonesia, informed an OSSCo
representative in January 1962 about ‘his Minister’s concern over the poor
results which dl are achieving’, and ‘the lack of co-ordination amongst their
42 ‘Maclaines, London’, Vinke to Holt, 15-2-1960, oa/1869/1.
43 Parcel 79, memorandum on harbours, c. Sept 1961, oa/1869/1.
44 ‘1962. Private Djakarta, April to July’, Spreckley to Holt, 4-7-1962, enclosing extract from
Business News 777/778, oa/1869/1.
45 ‘1961 Djakarta, June–Dec’, copy of Day, chairman Indonesia–Europe Freight Conference,
to Ismojo, dl, 29-11-1961, oa/1869/1.
46 ‘Ministry of Transport correspondence’, Hobhouse to Gardner, 31-5-1963, oa/1869/2.
47 Beagley to Dickinson, 25-7-1960, mt 59/3234, tna.
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Agents’.48 But dl’s executives were hidebound by the overbearing influence of
theministry on its operations. In 1960,Holtwas toldbyKosasih, headof dl, that
the latter ‘did not approve’ of plans to purchase Polish- and Japanese-built ves-
sels, wishing to see amore phased expansion of dlwith British-owned tonnage
filling the gap. Kosasih was also battling against naval ‘interference’.49 In 1962
dl suspended its Indonesia–Japan service, despite its good prospects, given
that one vessel had been sequestered by the navy, and two others seconded
to pelni.50 Ideological inflexibility, meanwhile, stymied Etherington’s plan to
overcome Indonesia’s shipping problems by employing a European contrac-
tor because ‘the Government preferred to restrict the influence of foreigners to
what it now is’.51
Dutch interests experienced a reprise with the settling of the Irian Jaya
dispute and the emergence of Britain as Indonesian enemy number one in
the ‘Ganyang Malaysia’ (Crush Malaysia) campaign. In February 1965, copra,
tea, and timber shipments recommenced to the Netherlands.52 Consignments
were offered again to Dutch ships, including the nsmo (despite its British
ownership). From the autumn of 1965, with a ƒ 100 million credit guarantee
offered by the government in The Hague, some Dutch capital, services, and
personnel returned. But this was on a contract basis only for the state-owned
successors to the Dutch—for example, in the rehabilitation of tin dredges, and
sugar and palm-oil factories.53 There would be no return of direct investment
from theNetherlands. Even limitedDutch re-engagementwas feared in Jakarta
as a ‘Trojan Horse’.54
Indonesia’s economic implosion continued. In March 1965, Tanjung Priok,
Jakarta’s port, was closed to foreign shipping because the congestion hadmade
it ‘virtually unworkable’.55 The situation was no better in Sumatra. The backlog
48 ‘1962 Jan–March. Djakarta’, Caldicott, Singapore to Holt, 20-1-1962, oa/1869/1.
49 Discussion with Holt, 26-3-1960, oa/1869.
50 ‘1962 Jan–March. Djakarta’, extract from letter to Butterfield & Swire, Tokyo in Graham,
mw, Jakarta to Holt, 27-3-1962, oa/1869/1.
51 ‘Djakarta 1963’, Graham to Holt, 11-1-1963, oa/1869/1.
52 ‘Djakarta. Jan–Mar 1965’, nsmo, Amsterdam tonsmo, Jakarta andnsmo, Jakarta to nsmo,
Amsterdam, 5-2-1965, oa/1869/2.
53 ‘Current Djakarta correspondence’, Boerstra, nsmo, Jakarta to Holt, 8-9-1965, enclosing
extract from Antara, 1-9-1965, oa/1869/2; Boerstra to Amsterdam, 13-10-1965, enclosing
extract from Antara, 23-9-1965.
54 Gleichman, nsmo to Holt, 17-11-1964, reporting conversation with Ismojo, head of dl,
oa/1696/2.
55 ‘Djakarta. Jan–Mar 1965’, Holt to Gleichman, 15-3-1965, oa/1869/2.
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of exportswas such that passenger services on theDeli railwaywere suspended
so that the locomotives could pull the freight trains. But only one-third of the
engines were in working order, spare parts being unobtainable given the short-
age of foreign exchange.56 In July, ‘bad port conditions and lack of shipping’
meant that 100,000 chests of teawere storedon the estates awaiting shipment.57
The gridlock proved difficult to alleviate under the New Order. Blue Funnel’s
British-listed liners returned to Indonesian ports after 1967, but ‘ship delays and
cargo uncertainty persist[ed]’.58
Their more gradual economic decolonization meant that Malaysia and Sin-
gapore did not suffer the same dislocations. British ship-owners were not
enamouredwith Port Swettenham (renamedKlang after 1972).What was being
promoted as the peninsula’s principal entrepot was described in November
1963 by the OSSCo’s agents as a ‘mess’. New wharves were expected to pro-
vide only a ‘partial improvement’.59 But Sir Paul Chambers, the chairman of
Imperial Chemical Industries, one of the uk’s leading exporters, ‘spoke enthu-
siastically’ inNovember 1965 about ‘the cargo handlingmethods on Singapore’s
new berths’.60 Though after 1965 Malaysia’s long-term objective was to reduce
dependence upon Singapore, liberal exchange controlsmeant that exporters in
southernMalaya could still use the island’s import-export facilities. The dredg-
ing required at Klang would not allowMalaysia to receive container ships until
1973 (a year after Singapore), but Oceanmanagers were confident that shippers
could forward goods by rail to Singapore in the interim.61
They could also use the feeder services of the British-controlled and Singa-
pore-registered Straits Steamship Company (SSCo), which was the equivalent
of kpm/pelni in Malaysia’s and Singapore’s local shipping service, and was
part of the Liverpool-based Ocean group. The post-colonial experiences of
kpm and SSCo proved very different. The former diversified into trades outside
Indonesia in other parts of Asia, southern Africa and South America, even
before the takeover of December 1957 (À Campo 1998:14, 28–9). The latter
continued to contribute to the modernization of Malaysia and Singapore for
two and a half decades after the independence of Malaya.
56 Visit to Medan, 13/14-2-1965 by Boerstra, 19-2-1965, oa/1869/2.
57 ‘Current Djakarta correspondence’, Boerstra to Amsterdam, 13-7-1965, oa/1869/2.
58 OSSCo Annual Report and Accounts (hereafter AR&A/Cs) 1968:15–18, oa/4031/1.
59 McNeill, Mansfields to McDavid, Glen Line, 29-11-1963, oa/2116.
60 Reported from Minister of Transport’s Advisory Panel meeting by Sir John Nicholson,
chairman OSSCo, ‘Shipping Advisory Panel, 1963’, letter toWingate, Mansfields, 2-12-1965,
oa/1870.
61 Blue Funnel Line (bfl) minutes, 20-7-1970, oa/1772/4.
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There were tougher operating conditions by the early 1970s. The Malaysian
International Shipping Corporation (misc) and Singapore’s Neptune Orient
Line (nol), aided by flag discrimination and/or priority berthing arrange-
ments, encroached on SSCo activities. Political pressures led to the holding
down of freight rates and the switch of port charges from consignees to ship-
owners.62 Yet, SSCo co-existed with the national lines. Though providing a
useful instrument for the suppression of regional rebellions through troop-
carrying, kpm rejected indigenization or any further cooperation with the
Indonesian government during the 1950s, thus ‘accelerat[ing] the decoloniza-
tion crisis’ (À Campo 1998:36). In 1960, however, SSCo formed a Malayan sub-
sidiary, known as Kris. This succeeded to SSCo’s shipyard at Butterworth, and
ran its own fleet, flying the Federation’s ensign, in the trades between Penang
and the Malayan coast ports, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia. Malayan direc-
tors were appointed to the board, and indigenes were trained as officers. Nev-
ertheless, day-to-day management remained in the hands of Mansfields, the
managers of SSCo who also happened to be the Liverpool parent’s wholly
owned Singapore-based shipping agents.63
To preserve its intra-Malaysian shipping, bumiputera capital was increas-
ingly brought into Kris. Services out of Klang were controlled by the Malay
majority by 1978. Management was also indigenized.64 By 1975, over 50 of
SSCo’s 65 executive staff in Singapore and Malaysia were permanent resi-
dents.65 SSCo’s future was secured in a consolidation of the Ocean group’s
Southeast Asian interests in 1973. SSComergedwithMansfields (as well as Blue
Funnel’s Straits–West Australia service), retaining both its British control and
its role in shipping. But SSCo also diversified into related, cutting-edge activi-
ties. Centred on the Singapore hub, the SSCo group developed integrated land,
sea, and air services, with intermodal distribution networks made possible by
the new methods of containerization and computerization. By the mid 1970s,
as well as shipping, SSCo’s portfolio covered precision engineering, offshore
oil-industry services, air transportation and freight-forwarding, travel and tour
operation, car rental, data processing, and property development andmanage-
ment.66
62 Notes by Alexander, chairman OSSCo for directors, 1-5-1970 and 12-2-1971, oa/jla/22/3.
63 ‘Shipping company formed with $30 million capital’, Malay Mail, 5-12-1960.
64 OceanTransport&Trading (ott) Ltd boardminutes, 23-7-1974 and 28-1-1975, oa/jla/27/1;
ott Ltd AR&A/Cs 1977, oa/5001/7; ott Ltd AR&A/Cs 1978, oa/5001/8.
65 Ocean: The Journal of the Ocean Steam Ship Company 1975:131, oa/697/2.
66 Ocean: The Journal of the Ocean Steam Ship Company December 1971:5–7; 1975:128–31,
oa/697/2.
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In 1979, SSCo experienced its highest pre-tax profits ever recorded.67 In 1983,
Ocean disposed of its 58% shareholding in SSCo, given the limited cash divi-
dends and an over-supply of property on the Singaporeanmarket.68 This, how-
ever, was a voluntary divestment by the multinational logistics group. It was
not forced by the host governments, and did not result in the organizational
skills gap that was experienced in Indonesia.
There would be no ‘crowding out’ of foreign capital in ocean-going ship-
ping either. Blue Funnel’s sailings eastward were reduced from eight to seven
sailings per month in 1971, given competition from misc and nol.69 By 1978,
Singapore possessed Asia’s second-largest fleet; by 1981, nol was the world’s
twelfth-largest container-shipping company (Broeze 1987:85, 2002:65). With
easy access to credit as a government-linked corporation, misc grew rapidly,
too (Broeze 1987:88).
But Blue Funnel Linemanagers were confident back in 1972 that Singapore’s
government was ‘dedicated to increased trade’ and was unlikely therefore to
‘restrict cargo to Gov[ernmen]t loaders’. misc might ‘fiddle’ the rules, but it
was not expected to leave the British-dominated Far East Freight Conference
(fefc), as Kuala Lumpur had openly announced support for the conference.70
In the 1980s, misc still carried ‘but a small share of Malaysia’s overseas trade’
(Broeze 1987:88). Singapore’s outward-facing economic development strategy
was confirmed in the containerization of its port from the late 1960s onwards
(Levinson 2006:210–11). Malaysia followed suit, and, by the 1970s, viewed trans-
portmodernization as a new realm of activity for bumiputera capital andman-
agement, but not to the exclusion of overseas shipping interests.71 Indonesia
was not containerized until 1981.72 Tanjung Priok did not feature among the
world’s top 20 container ports in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas Singapore was
a stalwart (and the leader in 1991) of this list, and Klang arrived on it in 1999
(Broeze 2002:169, 202).
67 ott Ltd AR&A/Cs 1979:5, oa/5001/9.
68 ott Ltd AR&A/Cs 1983:3, oa/5001/13.
69 bfl minutes, 3-5-1971, oa/1772/5.
70 bfl minutes, 28-4-1972, oa/1773.
71 Material in h&c, 37600.
72 ott Ltd AR&ACs 1981:4, oa/5001/11.
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Conclusion: Neo-Colonialism Redux?
Given Malaysia’s and Singapore’s open attitudes to foreign capital it might be
tempting to conclude that British decolonization produced quisling satellite
states. But this was an increasingly anachronistic trope, as plantation andmin-
ing companies were Malayized in the 1970s and 1980s, and from the late 1950s
land improvement, replanting, and price stabilization schemes in Malaya/
Malaysia favoured indigenous smallholders rather than big plantations (Hen-
ley 2012: s33–4; Ong 2015:96, 98, 121–2).
Nor was Anglophone Southeast Asia constricted by British financial inter-
ests. Even in his revival of neo-Marxist interpretations of decolonization, Sut-
ton recognizes that Malayan ministers were able to win concessions between
1956 and 1957, notably post-colonial military and development aid, given
Britain’s dependency upon Malaya’s dollar earnings (Sutton 2015:152–9). Stick-
ingwith sterling into the early 1970s on the part of bothMalaysia and Singapore
was not the jejune reluctance of a fledgling to leave the nest, but rather was
caused by the appreciation of Malaysian decision-makers that there was little
alternative, given theweakness of theus dollar (whichwas devalued inDecem-
ber 1971 and again in February 1973). Tokyo, on the other hand, had still not
made available effective facilities for the yen to be held by non-residents, while
interest rate differentials ensured that sterling assets yielded a higher return
than those valued in dollars.73
In contrast to Indonesia’s sudden rupture with the Netherlands, Malaysia
and Singapore chose incremental ways of ‘breaking free’, and proved them-
selves adept at bending foreign investment to meet national objectives. More-
over, during the 1960s, Malaysia and Singapore were capable of subverting the
designs of long-established British business interests, when that suited them.
The emergence of misc and nol, for example, represented the rejection of a
plan put up in 1962 by the British ship-owners to form their ownMalayan sub-
sidiary within fefc. The uk lines thus ended up with their nightmare scenario
conjured up at the Singapore split: ‘two Lines extra instead of only one’.74
In further critique of neo-colonialist models, local elites had considerable
agency in the decolonization process (Stockwell 1998; Thomas, Moore and
Butler 2015:343), even ‘if some were used as European instruments to “orga-
nize” independence inways conducive to European interests’ (Dülffer and Frey
73 Note for the record, 11-3-1971, ov 44/244, BoE; Note of a meeting, 14-5-1971; Meeting with
Malaysian Treasury and Bank Negara officials, 12-4-1972, ov 44/245; Note by Fogarty for
Acting High Commissioner, 29-1-1971 in Fogarty to Marshall, 29-1-1971.
74 Thomson, Ben Line to Nicholson, 18-8-1965, oa/2116.
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2011:2–3). The configuration of indigenous powerbrokers varied from territory
to territory, and this diversity influenced how decolonization compacts were
subsequently rejected, accepted, or adapted in post-colonial states.
Malaysia’s ruling political classwas an amalgamof Malay aristocrats-turned-
administrators and Chinese and Indian business leaders. They were unlikely
to seek an overnight overhaul of economic relations with the former imperial
power. The first twoministers of finance in Kuala Lumpur, H.S. Lee (1956–1959)
and Tan Siew Sin (1959–1974), were wealthy towkay (business and community
leaders) whose tin, rubber, and trading interests relied upon global markets.
The case of Singapore, despite the shared British colonial heritage, was not
identical. The left-leaning professionals who came to dominate the pap were
distanced from Singapore’s Chinese business elite, and more inclined toward
state intervention in the economy. Despite being a cousin of Tan Siew Sin, Goh
Keng Swee, Singapore’s first finance minister (1959–1967), began his career as a
civil servant in the post-war Department of Social Welfare. This likely explains
whySingaporewasmoreprepared to challenge the sterling-area compact in the
late 1960s/early 1970s.75 nol, revealingly, was completely government-owned,
whereasmisc had a 40% shareholding from the private sector, andwas headed
by the well-connected entrepreneur Robert Kuok.76
Even so, Singapore’s state-led capitalism did not entail an Indonesian-style
rejection of foreign private enterprise. Lacking the protection of a Greater
Malaysian common market after the 1965 divorce, as well as a primary pro-
ducing export base, the island state sought export-oriented industrialization
(eoi) to provide employment opportunities to tame the pap’s power base in the
‘politically powerful labor class’. To remain globally competitive, Singapore’s
economic development required foreign capital (Ritchie 2009:439).
After touring Republican-held areas of Indonesia in early 1947, George Holt
shrewdly appreciated that ‘[m]ost Holland-educated Indonesians naturally
gravitated to left-wing circles in Europe and the view commonly held by the
left-wing in Holland that the Netherlands Indies was being exploited by Dutch
and other European capitalists, has […] become orthodox opinion’.77 Increas-
ingly under the spell of the pki, hostility towards expatriate enterprises was
central to Sukarno’s philosophy. The mcp made a comeback in the 1960s and
75 In the restructuring of the sterling area after the devaluation of 1967, Singapore was
branded by the Bank of England as a ‘difficult customer’ prone to look ‘exclusively at
her own narrow interests’, with, inter alia, ambitions to develop an international money
market to rival colonial Hong Kong’s. Note by Stone, 21-3-1972, ov 44/195.
76 bfl minutes, 28-4-1972, oa/1773.
77 Holt to Hobhouse, 17-3-1947, enclosing report on visit, 21 Feb–8 March, oa/2537/1.
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1970s, but yet again in the guise of armed struggle, and the Malaysian commu-
nists never played the power-broking role of their Indonesian comrades (Ong
2015). Until the bloody purges of 1965–1966, the pki had to be satiated. Gradu-
alism was less of an option in Indonesia, and anti-Westernism proved difficult
to shake off in the 1970s.
Yet, in the cases of Malaysia and Singapore, development strategieswere less
reactive against the ex-colonial presence, and so less retarding for the post-
colonial economies, because the decolonization settlements in Anglophone
Southeast Asia were so much less restrictive. Tipton identifies a rejection of
colonialism as a key ingredient in the forging of Southeast Asia’s state-led
capitalisms. But the ‘existential envy or ressentiment’ was always of an angrier
order in Indonesia compared to Malaysia and Singapore (Tipton 2009:420). In
1961, Indonesia’s shipping adviser, Norman Etherington, opined that ‘Britain
had gained a great reputation in granting to her former colonies political and
economic independence’ in contrast to ‘the Belgians and the Dutch who had
tried to get away with conceding only the former’.78
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